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¿Opacidad hace el capital patrimonial costoso para los bancos?
Resumen
Los banqueros habitualmente aseguran que el capital propio es costoso, lo que contradice el 
teorema de irrelevancia de Modigliani-Miller. Un banco opaco debe señalizar su solvencia al 
pagar dividendos altos y estables para mantener tranquilos a los depositantes. Esta señaliza-
ción puede requerir costosas liquidaciones si el rendimiento sobre los activos ha sido pobre, 
pero no pagar estos dividendos podría provocar un pánico bancario. Un banco fuertemente 
capitalizado debe mantener una cantidad considerable de activos improductivos sin riesgo, 
dado que la cantidad de acciones es alta, siendo esto costoso. Los dividendos son informativos 
del estado del banco. Depositantes racionales reaccionan ante ellos.
Clasificación JEL: G21, G35, D82
Palabras clave: dividendos, capital bancario, teorema de irrelevancia.
Faz opacidade caro capital patrimonial para os bancos?
Resumo
Os banqueiros habitualmente asseguram que o capital próprio é custoso, o que contradiz o 
teorema de irrelevância de Modigliani-Miller. Um banco opaco deve sinalizar sua solvência 
pagando dividendos altos e estáveis para manter tranquilos aos depositantes. Esta sinalização 
pode requerer custosas liquidações se o rendimento sobre os ativos tem sido pobre, mas não 
pagar estes dividendos poderia provocar pânico bancário. Um banco fortemente capitaliza-
do deve manter uma quantidade considerável de ativos improdutivos sem risco dado que a 
quantidade de ações é alta, sendo isto custoso. Os dividendos são informativos do estado do 
banco. Depositantes racionais reagem ante eles.
Classificação JEL: G21, G35, D82
Palavras-chave: dividendos, capital bancário, teorema da irrelevância
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1 Introduction
Banking differs from other industries in many ways. One of the most obvious 
differences is the funding structure. If one looks at the annual reports of com-
panies in manufacturing or non-financial services, corporate debt almost never 
accounts for 90 - 97 % of the balance sheet total. Such an extreme leverage is the 
norm rather than an exception among banks, and because of various off-balance 
sheet operations the true leverage is often even more extreme. If the government 
did not impose capital adequacy regulations on banks, capitalisation might be 
even weaker. Why is banking so different from other industries? Bank managers 
consider equity “expensive”, but why does equity become more “expensive” in 
relative terms if it is used to finance loans instead of, say, machinery? This paper 
intends to present a potential explanation to this phenomenon.
The tendency to perceive equity “costly” seems to contradict the irrelevance 
theorem of Modigliani and Miller (1958). This theorem is based on a number of 
assumptions. For instance, it is assumed that the value of assets is not affected 
by the structure of the liability side of the balance sheet. This assumption is not 
necessarily valid in banking. Diamond (1984) proposes that debt on the balance 
sheet induces the banker to monitor debtors because no loan losses can be passed 
on to financiers. Diamond and Rajan (2001) propose that weak solvency may be 
a strategic commitment against debtors’ attempts to renegotiate loan contracts. 
Calomiris and Kahn (1991) propose that depositors’ possibility to make with-
drawals might induce the banker not to abscond with the funds. Debt issued 
by banks has got both preferential fiscal treatment and implicit and explicit go-
vernment guarantees, encouraging extreme leverage (Keeley 1990, Admati et 
al., 2010). The relative costs of debt and equity capital may not differ from other 
industries, but the cost of funding is more essential in financial intermediation 
than in, say, retail trade (see Hanson et al., 2011). Different explanations to bank 
aversion to strong capitalisation are not mutually exclusive.
Interestingly, this tendency to regard capital “expensive” has become 
stronger over time. In the past, banks used to have much more equity capital 
in relative terms, and obviously bank managers did not find equity particu-
larly expensive. (See e.g. Åhman 1943 p. 70, Saunders & Wilson 1999; Thies & 
Gerlowski 1993) This change in the way of thinking may be due to implicit and 
explicit governmental safety nets, or, as will be proposed in the following, to 
the increasing opaqueness of modern banking.
This paper combines previous theories on bank runs and dividend signa-
lling. The original Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model was intended to explain why 
and how banks convert short-maturity deposits to long-term investments, and 
what kinds of risks are involved. The idea of using dividends to signal pro-
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fitability was briefly discussed already by Miller and Modigliani (1961, p. 430), 
and a seminal theoretical contribution was presented by Bhattacharya (1979); 
paying dividends is wasteful because of tax reasons, but if paying them is less 
expensive for profitable firms than for less profitable ones, dividends are a cre-
dible signal, and they enhance the market value of the firm. Recent empirical 
evidence in favour of this approach is presented by e.g. Al-Yahyaee et al., (2011). 
Dividend cuts may be an especially adverse signal, and empirical evidence 
reviewed in section five indicates that avoiding them drives many companies’ 
dividend policies.
Dividend cuts may have adverse signalling effects in any industry, but the 
effect is probably particularly strong in banking. There are two reasons for this. 
1) Banks are inherently opaque. Rating agencies disagree on banks’ credit-
worthiness more often than in the case of comparable companies in other 
industries (Iannotta, 2006; Morgan, 2002), and these disagreements have 
become more commonplace over time (Morgan, 2002). Further evidence 
on bank opaqueness is presented by e.g. Hirtle (2006). The absence of other 
sources of information increases the relative role of any available signal.
2) In no other industry the value of a company depends as strongly on how 
counterparties perceive it. Deposit runs can be triggered even by self-ful-
filling expectations, let alone adverse signals. Deposit runs do not occur in 
mining and manufacturing.
When bank opaqueness is discussed, the focus is often on the asset side of 
the balance sheet, but even broadly understood bank liabilities have become 
opaque. For instance, many banks have established off-balance sheet investment 
vehicles, such as SIVs and conduits, that acquire loan funding in the market, 
but are effectively guaranteed by the sponsoring bank without being included 
in the publicly disclosed group balance sheet. If a bank arranges a commercial 
paper program and sells credit risk protection against defaults on this debt in 
the CDS market, it is effectively collecting short-maturity funding in order to 
finance its customer, and the bank does not dispose of the default risk. However, 
no additional debt is reported on the balance sheet.
These days even supervisors with their privileged access to confidential 
information often seem unable to assess the true leverage of banks. At least it 
is difficult to mention any pre-crisis initiatives of supervisors to regulate off-
balance sheet vehicles. Increasing opaqueness must have some impact on the 
signalling value of whatever the bank does in the market.
Even though banks have no legal obligation to pay dividends, equity capital 
appears paradoxically about twice as expensive as debt in terms of cash flows. 
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The OECD (2010, p. 11) published the list of the ten largest banks in the euro area 
in 2006. In the light of data found in annual reports, the non-weighted average 
ratio of dividends to the book value of shareholders’ equity in this group was 
8,7 % in 2006, the last year before the financial crisis, and the median was 7,0 %. 
The annual average interest rate on non-collateralised three months interbank 
loans, the Euribor rate, was 3,1 % in 2006. In no bank of the sample the dividend 
yield on shareholders’ equity was lower than this average money market rate. 
Hence, prior to the global financial crisis, the market was used to bank dividends 
higher than the rate of interest banks on bank debt, and paying something less 
would have been an adverse signal.
The model presented in this paper combines dividend signalling models and 
the Diamond-Dybvig bank run model. The bank needs to hold extra liquidity 
instead of illiquid yet return generating assets in order to be able to make large 
dividend payments; not doing so might trigger a deposit run. The dividend has 
got value as a Spencian signal because profitable institutions can finance larger 
payments than unprofitable ones. If the bank is opaque, it is not possible to say 
what the true leverage of the institution is, and observers pay attention to the 
easily observable dividend per share, not to the non-verifiable ratio of total di-
vidends to risks or assets. The more equity has been issued, the more dividend 
payments the bank must be prepared to pay in total, which is costly.
Section two presents the assumptions of the model. Sections three and four 
analyse two different versions of the model. Section five compares the findings 
of the theoretical analysis and some previous empirical observations. Section 
six discusses the findings.
2 Assumptions
There is a bank. The bank is a monopoly. It can acquire funding from investors 
with two financial instruments.
1) Short-term deposits with a fixed interest rate.
2) Permanent equity capital.
There is a given number (N, N >> 0) of uncoordinated investors. The bank 
knows how numerous they are and where to find them. Each investor has got 
one unit of monetary savings to be invested in either bank equity or deposits. 
Each investor can also keep the sum as risk-free currency.
There are two kinds of investors. Type A investors know they will need 
no means of payment before the planned closure of the bank at stage five (see 
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below). They accept both equity investments (E) and deposit contracts (D). 
Type B investors run the risk of being subject to a liquidity shock at stage four, 
and they do not accept equity because not consuming at an early stage would 
result in huge disutility. The number of type B investors who may be subject to 
a liquidity shock is NΩ, and the probability of a shock is λ (0 < λ < 1) for each 
of them. The values on N and Ω are not public knowledge but the value of λ is. 
Investors of same type have completely identical preferences. In practice, pa-
rameters N, Ω and λ determine how much liquidity shock related withdrawals 
the bank could expect under normal circumstances. One could assume that Ω 
is always + 1 and could therefore be omitted, but if all investors run the risk of 
a liquidity shock nobody invests in bank equity unless equities can be sold at a 
later stage. A stock exchange and new investors entering the market should be 
assumed, or at least implicitly assumed.
It would be unrealistic to assume that the bank would know the probability 
of a liquidity shock better than the savers themselves; therefore λ is publicly 
known. Instead, information on bank financiers is not observable without insider 
information. Therefore, it is meaningful to assume that omega is not publicly 
known but lambda is.
Things happen in the following order.
1) Funding; The bank observes what kinds of investment assets are available. 
It observes the realisation of the liquidation value (Z, 0 < Z < 1) of available 
assets. This liquidation value is a random draw from a known distribution. 
Customers know the distribution Z is coming from, but not its value. The 
bank contacts privately each investor. The bank observes the type of each 
investor and offers either a deposit contract or the possibility to invest in 
equity. It chooses and publicly announces a fixed interest rate δ it promises 
to pay its depositors. An investor can either accept the offer of the bank or 
reject it. The bank knows how much debt it has issued but it cannot prove 
its funding structure.
2) Investments; The bank decides how much to invest in an illiquid yet pro-
ductive asset and how much to keep as liquidity buffers (L) consisting of 
risk-free currency with no return. The sum of investments (I) and liquidity 
must equal the sum of equity and deposits (I + L = E + D). The bank cannot 
prove to anyone the amount of investments it has made.
3) Returns realised; The bank privately learns the return on its investments but 
cannot credibly prove this information to anyone. In most cases, with prob-
ability θ, the return on investments is normal, and the bank receives in cash 
the sum of the return α (0 < α < 1) per one unit of investments. The values 
of θ and α are publicly known. With probability 1 – θ there is no return.
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4) Withdrawing; Each depositor is paid the interest rate δ (0 < δ < 1) per one unit 
of deposits. The bank withdrawal desk opens. First, some type B investors 
notice they have been subject to a liquidity shock and they withdraw their 
savings. Second, dividends are paid. Third, remaining depositors observe 
the dividend. They become suspicious if the dividend is low; they no longer 
trust the bank and they decide to withdraw. Only non-suspicious depositors 
not subject to a liquidity shock will renew the deposit. If the bank has got 
an insufficient amount of currency (= L + return on assets) to pay interest 
payments and withdrawals, it is forced to sell some of its investment assets, 
or possibly all of them. The bank gets only Z (0 < Z < 1) units of currency 
per one unit of liquidated assets. If the bank is unable to pay all withdraw-
als, those who come last to withdraw get nothing. The withdrawal desk is 
closed at the end of stage four.
5) End; Investments mature. Each unit of investments not liquidated at stage 
four is now worth the original investment 1. If possible, depositors are paid 
the sum they deposited and again the interest rate δ per one unit of deposits. 
Any residual is divided between equity holders.
The rather extreme structure of the funding market is intended to be con-
sistent with the concept of “cost of equity” for the bank. Irrespective of the 
instrument, the funding comes from the same source and the question is how 
to optimise the combination of equity and deposits. The real-life analogue of a 
depositor may be an institutional investor who has invested in short maturity 
instruments issued by an off-balance sheet vehicle guaranteed by the bank.1
The following assumptions on parameter values are made. It is never pos-
sible to pay all the withdrawals at stage four without liquidating assets if all the 
savings of investors have been invested at stage two (α < Ωλ = > 1 > Ω > α / λ). 
It is never profitable to make an investment and to liquidate it at stage four be-
cause the sum of the return α and the value Z of a liquidated investment is less 
than the original investment 1. (1 > Z + α) No investor can invest in the asset 
directly. For instance, there might be a relatively large minimum investment no 
individual could make alone. The bank cannot offer any other types of finan-
cial contracts than above described short-term deposits and permanent equity.
1 One might also reinterpret the formal model by assuming that each investor has more 
than one unit of savings, and at least some of them know that they are going to need the share 
λ of their savings at stage 1 and make some withdrawals. The maximum amount of equity 
would be 1 – λ times the number of financiers. Savers would hold a portfolio consisting of both 
deposits and equity investments. The mathematics of the model would remain unaffected.
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As will be seen in the proof of proposition 2, at least in the first version of the 
model this condition induces the bank not to prepare itself for the unlikely 
event of bad times.
Two different versions of the model are analysed.
1) There may be an exogenously given dividend ηg. If the dividend is lower, 
a run takes place and all depositors try to withdraw. Both the bank and its 
customers know the value of ηg. This dividend is higher than any deposit 
rate the bank might offer (ηg > δ).
2) Alternatively, the probability of run (r) is a decreasing function of the divi-
dend η.
When depositors decide whether to renew the deposit at stage four, they 
react to the dividend per share, not to the total amount of dividends. This is a 
meaningful assumption if and only if the bank is so opaque that the true le-
verage of the institution is non-verifiable. Creditors do not know how many 
other creditors exist. If the bank issues more equity, no one can tell whether the 
bank reduces leverage or simply expands. If the bank were more transparent, 
financiers could calculate the amount of dividend payments per risk-weighted 
assets, which would be more indicative of the state of the bank.
The bank is risk neutral and it minimises E(ψ), which is the expected value 
of the loss relative to the hypothetical case where the bank could simply invest 
all the savings of its financiers, issue nothing but equity and never liquidate 
anything at stage four, which would be possible if no financiers faced the risk of 
being subject to a liquidity shock (Ω = 0). The loss ψ consists of the expected value 
of unrealised revenue from undone investments (θαL) and the expected value 
of losses caused by premature liquidations of assets at stage four, which equals 
E(ψ) = θα L + (1 – Z) * E(H) (1)
where H = premature asset liquidations. This objective function is relatively simi-
lar to the one used by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Even Modigliani and Miller 
implicitly assumed that the company tries to maximise the market value of its 
liabilities. The value of bank liabilities is obviously a monotonically decreasing 
function of ψ. The objective function is non-standard because the decision of 
the undertaking is non-standard. The usual assumptions of profit or sharehol-
der value maximisation are meaningful if certain stakeholders are exogenously 
assigned the shareholder status and the undertaking makes decisions on prices 
or quantities, not on anyone’s shareholder status. But if the undertaking decides 
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who the shareholders are and how many of them there should be, one must 
assume another objective function. Would the bank pursue an infinite ROE by 
issuing no equity at all, even though there would be no shareholders who would 
benefit from profits? Or would it have a more complicated objective function? 
Possibly it might maximise a weighted average of total profit and ROE, but how 
would the weights be determined?
Although the model is strongly inspired by the original Diamond-Dybvig 
model, there are a number of differences. The original model assumed no other 
funding instrument than deposits. All consumers were identical and risk averse. 
The return of investments held till maturity was risk-free and materialised at 
the end of the project. Moreover, the bank had got no signalling device. Assets 
could be liquidated without destroying them, and nothing but the revenue 
was lost. In this paper there are two kinds of financial contracts, two kinds of 
investors, and the bank actively uses a signalling device. Moreover, the return 
on investments is random, possible revenue materialises at an early stage and 
assets cannot be liquidated prematurely at their full value.
3 Solving the model - threshold dividend
Now, it is assumed that the run will take place with certainty unless an exoge-
nously given relatively high minimum dividend ηg is paid. This value may be 
determined by dividends paid by the bank in the past, or by other (possibly 
foreign) banks’ standard practices. Paying a higher dividend would not affect 
depositors’ behaviour, but paying less would trigger a run. Technically, such 
a threshold dividend could exist even in a full information setting, and all the 
mathematics of the model would remain unchanged. If depositors reacted to a 
low dividend by panicking even under full information, the dividend would 
become a mere “sunspot” in the sense that there would be no logical connection 
between the dividend and the reaction. Financiers would have already observed 
the soundness of the bank anyway, and they would not try to extract additional 
information from the dividend.
The analysis is restricted to cases where ηgE < D – λΩN; hereafter this con-
dition is called the indebtedness condition. If this condition is not satisfied the 
amount of deposits and other types of short maturity debt after normal with-
drawals is so small that the bank would need more currency to pay the expected 
dividend than to pay its panicking depositors in a run. Such an institution could 
exist, but nobody would call it a bank. Whenever the share of depositors who 
are potentially subject to a liquidity shock (Ω) is large enough, the bank must 
collect deposits, and the indebtedness condition must be satisfied.
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It is easy to demonstrate that the bank tries to avoid the run at any cost.
Proposition 1: If the indebtedness condition is valid, not paying the dividend ηg is never 
a less costly alternative than paying it.
If the bank pays normal withdrawals and interest rates at stage four, but the 
dividend is not paid, a run occurs. In this case the liquidation cost equals
Max{[(1 + δ)D – L – α’I] (1 – Z) / Z, 0} (2)
α’ ∈ (α, 0), depending on the return on investments.
The corresponding liquidation cost, when the run is prevented by paying 
the dividend, is
Max{[ηgE – L – α’I + ΩλN + δD](1 – Z) / Z, 0} (3)
(3) cannot be greater than (2) if the indebtedness condition is satisfied.
ηgE + ΩλN < D 
ó ηgE – L – α’I + ΩλN + δD < (1 + δ)D – L – α’I (4)
If the bank is unable to pay all the depositors, the loss caused by not paying 
the dividend equals I(1 – Z), which is the highest liquidation cost that could be 
observed. No alternative can be more costly.
QED
At stage 2 the bank must choose how much currency to hold. Because a 
significant part of depositors will withdraw anyway (Ωλ > 0), cases where no 
currency hoarding or liquidations would be needed can be ruled out. The mere 
return on assets cannot be high enough to cover withdrawals because by as-
sumption α < Ωλ. The bank has got the following options at stage 2.
1) It may hoard enough currency to be able to pay the dividend, interest on 
deposits and withdrawals without liquidating assets even when the invest-
ment yields no return. In this case, the amount of currency must satisfy
L ≥ δD + ηgE + NλΩ (5)
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2) Alternatively, it may hoard enough currency to be able to pay the dividend 
without liquidating assets if and only if the return on assets is normal. 
δD + ηgE + NλΩ > L ≥ δD + ηgE – α I + NλΩ (6)
3) It may hold a very limited amount of currency, implying that some invest-
ments will be liquidated even in the normal state.
L < δ D + ηgE + NλΩ – αI (7)
Making investments that need to be liquidated in any case is not rational because 
by assumption α < (1 – Z), and the third alternative can be ignored. It is more 
interesting to analyse whether the bank would decide to prepare itself to pay 
the expected payments even in the bad state without liquidations.
Proposition 2: The optimal amount of currency hoarded at stage two is barely suffi-
cient for dividend and other payments at stage four under normal asset return and no 
liquidations.
PROOF: See Appendix 1
The result is basically intuitive. Because currency yields no return, the bank does 
not want to keep any extra balances. The bank is always prepared to make all 
the necessary payments at least in the good state. If the bad state were relatively 
likely (i.e. theta low), it would find it optimal to hoard enough currency to be 
prepared even for the bad state, but by assumption, theta is close to 1.
Everyone behaves rationally, given the strategy of the counterparty. If the 
dividend is not paid, each depositor understands the bank is in trouble (propo-
sition 1). The quasi-sunspot makes every depositor believe everybody else tries 
to withdraw, although it may be too late to join the run. The indebtedness con-
dition implies that if the bank cannot pay the dividend, it certainly cannot pay 
all the panicking depositors in the run. Therefore, a rational depositor reacts to 
non-payment by running to the withdrawal desk. This behaviour is consistent 
with the beliefs of other depositors and the outcome is a Perfect Bayesian Equili-
brium. Nevertheless, the equilibrium is not unique because a very large number 
of potential threshold dividends would satisfy the same equilibrium criteria.
Proposition 3: Let the indebtedness condition be valid. The expected value of the total 
loss ψ increases if the amount of equity capital increases at the cost of deposits.
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PROOF: See Appendix 2.
This result basically implies that equity is expensive. Paying the dividend under 
normal circumstances is expensive because the bank must hoard non-productive 
currency. In most cases this means loss of investment revenue. If the bad state 
materialises, the bank tries to save what can be saved and mimic normal profi-
tability by liquidating assets. It tries to maintain the dividend and to create an 
illusion of normal profitability. This is costly, and the more equity capital has 
been issued, the more liquidations are needed in the bad state to pay the divi-
dend expected by the market.
4 Optimising the dividend
4.1 Assumptions
It can be demonstrated that in a less extreme structure the optimal dividend is 
higher if bank assets earn the expected return. Moreover, the bank prefers to 
be thinly capitalised. Now, the bank can choose any dividend η it prefers; there 
is no specific threshold value. If the dividend is low, the probability of the run 
increases. A low dividend induces the most nervous depositor not subject to a 
liquidity shock to withdraw. Those who know this individual in person observe 
the combination of withdrawing and lack of liquidity shock. This observation 
makes them believe a run has begun, and they follow suit. Those who in turn 
know these ‘contaminated’ depositors will join the run, and the panic spreads 
in the social network. The bank knows how the probability of a run depends 
on the dividend. Increasing the dividend reduces the probability of run (P).
P = P(η); 0 ≤ P ≤ 1 ; P’ < 0; P’’ > 0 (8)
After stage one, investors cannot observe any other management decisions 
than the dividend. Parameters Ω and Z are not known by investors. The bank, 
instead, can observe these parameter values, even though it does not know be-
fore stage three whether investments were a success or a failure. Parameters α, 
λ and θ are known by all.
4.2 Analytical results
Proposition 4; The optimal dividend is higher if bank investments yield the return 
α than if they do not. 
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PROOF: See Appendix 3
This result is probably clarified by Figure I. The marginal cost of paying di-
vidends is zero until dividends must be financed at the margin by liquida-
ting assets, which happens at a lower level of dividends if investments have 
generated no revenue to be distributed. In the good state the cost of paying 
dividends is zero until η = [L + αI – Ωλ – δD] / E. In the bad state the marginal 
cost is zero until η = [L – Ωλ – δD] / E. Beyond this point the marginal cost of 
dividend payments is determined by the loss caused by premature liquida-
tions. The benefit from avoiding the run is marginally lower in the bad state 
than in the good state with each dividend; some costly liquidations are needed 
in the bad state anyway to finance any given dividend, implying that there 
is less to lose if a run takes place and the bank is forced to liquidate its whole 
balance sheet. The marginal cost curve and the marginal benefit curve of divi-
dend payments cross at a lower level of dividends in the bad state. There can 
be no cases where the amount of currency chosen by the bank at stage 2 would 
be insufficient to enable the dividend payment that will be made in the good 
state; it is always cheaper to be prepared and to keep enough currency than 
to buy assets that will be liquidated anyway. Hence, marginal benefit curve 
2 in cannot prevail; the bank would hoard more currency, shifting the point 
(L + αI – Ωλ – δD) / E to the right. Thus, the dividend is indicative of the state of 
the bank and not a pure sunspot.
E(1 – z) / z
0
[L – Ωλ – δD] / E [L + αI – Ωλ – δD ] / E η
Marginal cost of paying dividends in the good state
Marginal cost of paying dividends in the bad state
Marginal cost of paying dividends if same cost in both states
Bad state m
arginal benefit curve 1
Good state marginal benefit curve 1
Marginal benefit curve 2 (cannot prevail)
Figure 1. Marginal cost an benefits of dividends.
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4.3 Simulations
























 + δ < η <
If δ ≥ η = > r = 1; If η ≥ 1 = > r = 0.
(9)
When η = δ, the run is a certainty but the marginal effect of η on r is infinitely 
strong. The marginal impact weakens very fast with higher values of η. When 
η = 1, the marginal impact is zero and r = 0. This functional form is basically 
ad hoc, but it satisfies the conditions (8). Variables not observed by depositors 
(Ω and Z) are chosen for each simulation separately from the following distri-
butions.
Z rnd1 1– 1– 1– rnd1 1–
0.95*rnd2 1–
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
= θ θ + αθ + α






Where rnd1 and rnd2 are iid distributed random draws from an even dis-
tribution between 0 and 1. The distribution of Z covers values that satisfy the 
criteria (1 – Z)>α and θ >(1 – Z) / (1 – Z +α Z). The distribution of omega covers 
most of the values that satisfy the condition 1 > Ω > α / λ. (See section 2)
Eight different combinations of observable parameter variables were tested. 
Each combination was simulated 200 times with different values of Z and Ω 
determined by (10). The deposit rate was determined mechanically as δ = α/3. 
With this rule the bank never promises more interest payments on deposits than 
what investments would yield under favourable circumstances. The algorithm 
tested every possible combination of integer values for balance sheet variables 
(I, L, E, D) separately. The bank should have some equity and the lowest amou-
nt of equity tested in these simulations was + 1. A special subroutine searched 
an optimal value of dividends in both the good state and the bad state for each 
possible combination of balance sheet variables. The number of investors is 200 
in each simulation.
The algorithm minimises
E(ψ) = H (1 – Z) + θαL (11)
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Where H is the amount of investments liquidated at stage four. The amount 
of liquidations is determined either by the need of currency or by the amount 
of assets, whichever condition is binding. If a run takes place
H = Min {I, (ηE + (1 + δ) D – α'I – L)/Z} (12)
If no run takes place 
H = Min {I, (ηE + δD + NΩλ – α'I – L)/Z} (13)
where α’ is either α or 0, depending on the state of bank investments.
Results are summarised in Table 1. The following regularities can found in 
the results.
•	 In	every	case	the	optimal	amount	of	equity	is	one,	which	was	exogenously	
set as the absolute minimum. There is no exception in the whole set of 
200*8 = 1600 simulation rounds.
•	 In	each	case	the	average	bad	state	dividend	is	lower	than	the	average	good	
state dividend, implying that the dividend is indicative of the state of the 
bank.
•	 The	average	return	of	depositors	who	hold	their	investments	till	maturity	
(non-withdrawer) is higher than the return of those who experience a liquid-
ity shock and withdraw at stage four (withdrawers).
Table 1. Simulation results


















Average dividend  
in bad state
0.14 0.35 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17
Maximum dividend  
in the bad state
0.20 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
Average dividend  
in good state
0.47 0.56 0.64 0.57 0.69 0.65 0.70 0.74
Minimum dividend  
in good state
0.24 0.21 0.19 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.27
Average equity E 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Continúa
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Simulation set nr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Average investments I 144 149 146 173 171 183 182 180
Average non-
withdrawer’s return
0.24 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.03
Average withdrawer’s 
return
0.12 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01
Average withdrawers’ return = return of a depositor who withdraws at stage four in any case; Average non-
withdrawer’s return = return of a depositor who does not withdraw before stage five unless there is a run or a 
personal liquidity shock.
N = 200
δ = 0.3*α; θ = 0.995
5 A fully transparent bank
If the bank were fully transparent, the dividend should have no value as a sig-
nal because counterparties could observe the return on investments. It would 
be difficult to defend the assumption that a dividend cut would cause panic. If 
anything, creditors would be worried if they observed that the solvency of the 
bank is weakened by excessive dividends. At stage 4, financiers would base their 
decisions on withdrawals on the return on investments. If the return is weak, all 
depositors withdraw, and the loss due to premature liquidations is
Max {[(1 + δ)D – L] (1 – Z)/Z, 0} (14)
The probability of the run would not depend on the funding structure. Ob-
viously, the value of (14) is minimised if D is as low as possible. Hence, equity 
capital would be inexpensive because each financier participating in the run 
causes losses and shareholders cannot withdraw prematurely. Having issued 
equity instead of debt would protect the bank against liquidations.
6 The model and previous empirical literature
Lintner (1956) noticed that many companies maintain a stable dividend rate. 
They react sluggishly to new higher levels of profit and minimise the risk of 
having to drastically cut dividends. Garrett and Priestley (2000) found that 
unexpected increases in permanent earnings affect the current dividend whereas 
negative shocks have no observable impact, consistently with the hypothesis of 
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strong aversion to dividend cuts. Avoiding dividend cuts may have to do with 
signalling; at least this smoothing has been much more commonplace in the U.S. 
than in Hong Kong, where the institutional environment probably reduces the 
need for signalling (Chemmanur et al., 2010). Bond issuing rated companies 
are significantly more likely to smooth their dividends than non-rated firms, 
probably because bond issuers need to avoid sending negative signals, such as 
dividend cuts (Aivazian et al., 2006). Dividends have more information content 
in periods of economic adversity (Bozos et al., 2011), i.e. when the risk of bank 
runs is heightened.
Some empirical studies concentrate on banks’ dividend policies. The fin-
dings of Casey and Dickens (2000) and Newman et al., (2002) corroborated the 
hypothesis that large U.S. banks prefer paying stable dividends. Theis et al., 
(2010) found that U.S. banks tried to maintain stable dividends even during 
the recent financial crisis; in fact, no other correlate of dividends had as much 
explanatory power. Forti and Schiozer (2012) found that banks are more likely 
to pay high dividends if they rely on information-sensitive institutional depo-
sitors, and this behaviour became more pronounced during the financial crisis. 
However, there seem to be no detailed comparative studies on differences bet-
ween banks’ and non-banks’ dividend policies.
Maintaining stable dividends during difficult times would be almost useless 
as a signalling device if no attention were paid to dividends. The stock market 
reacts positively to dividend increases of bank holding companies (Filbeck & 
Mullineaux, 1999). If a bank announces dividend cuts, this often induces nega-
tive abnormal returns in non-announcing banks, presumably because investors 
interpret dividend cuts as signals on debtors’ financial problems (Bessler & 
Nohel, 2000).
Empirical evidence suggests that both fundaments and contagion play 
a role in bank runs, consistently with the assumptions made in section two. 
Weak banks were more likely to suffer from loss of deposits in the Argentine 
crisis (McCandless et al., 2003). Depositor groups have reacted to each others’ 
withdrawals (Starr & Yilmaz, 2007) and the decision to withdraw may spread 
from individual to individual in the social network (Iyer & Puri, 2012). Both 
withdrawals from failing banks and contagious runs can be identified in the 
Great Depression (Saunders & Wilson, 1996). A run can be triggered by signals 
that might even be interpreted as reassuring: retail depositors paradoxically 
started to queue at branch offices of Northern Rock when the Bank of England 
had announced its intention to support the bank (see e.g. Shin, 2009). In re-
al life, banks have reacted to liquidity risk by increasing their cash holdings 
(Sawada, 2010). 
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7 Discussion
Industry practitioners tend to argue that equity capital is expensive for banks. 
This claim contradicts the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem. This paper 
presents a potential explanation to this paradox. The explanation is based on 
banks’ vulnerability to deposit runs, which is a problem specific to credit insti-
tutions. It is argued that the viability of opaque banks with short maturity debt 
and illiquid assets depends on signalling. If the bank reveals its weak position 
by cutting dividends, suspicious counterparties withdraw funding. Such di-
vidend cuts may be particularly dangerous if financiers observe any signs of 
adverse macroeconomic developments, i.e. when low or negative asset returns 
become more likely. These nervous creditors may include both money market 
counterparties and retail depositors. Spencian signalling by paying dividends 
is possible because distributing non-existent profits is costly or even impossible. 
In real life, the bank might also signal its good state with share repurchases ins-
tead of dividend payments, provided these repurchases are publicly observable. 
In real life a high dividend may even be an alarming signal; if the bank dis-
tributes more to shareholders than what it used to, this might be interpreted as 
a sign of “cashing out”, especially if this happens during a recession. No bank 
would want to signal its lack of good investment possibilities during bad times 
by paying exceptionally high dividends. Araujo et al., (2011) have suggested 
a complicated U-shaped relationship between firm performance and optimal 
dividends; a company may also be unwilling to pay dividends if it is has got 
excellent investment possibilities. Investors’ tendency to underestimate the im-
pact of leverage may also affect the cost of capital (Levati et al., 2012).
The model has at least one obvious policy implication. If the public obser-
ves clear symptoms of a recession, it is reasonable to restrict banks’ dividend 
payments. If such a regulation is enforced and applies to all banks, dividend 
cuts tell nothing about the profitability of any particular institution, and bank 
solvencies could be enhanced with retained earnings without bank-specific 
adverse signalling effects.
In some cases the bank may be able to choose how opaque to be. The bank 
would probably prefer to keep at least the return on its assets opaque; with this 
opaqueness, not every downturn causes panic and forces the bank to liquidate 
assets at loss. The bank might survive for a while even when it knows it cannot 
pay all the depositors at stage five. Kaplan (2006) proves that in a slightly diffe-
rent Diamond-Dybvig type of model, the bank may or may not prefer to keep 
the return on its assets secret.
If investors are able to observe the true leverage of the bank, minimising 
the amount of capital in order to be able to maintain a high and stable dividend 
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yield irrespective of profitability would be an inefficient strategy. Counterparties 
would pay attention to the sum of dividends relative to the volume of opera-
tions rather than to the dividend per share, and choosing a weaker capitalisation 
would not make it easier to send reassuring signals. Thus, the model yields the 
following empirical prediction. Complex banking organisations, where the true 
leverage cannot be accurately estimated by outsiders, are more likely to consider 
equity capital expensive. A bank with simple operations, a transparent balance 
sheet and no off-balance sheet risks cannot mimic high profitability by choo-
sing an extreme leverage and paying a high and steady return on a tiny equity 
capital. Interestingly, minimising the capital base seems to have become more 
commonplace when banking has become more complicated. In the past, before 
derivatives and off-balance sheet vehicles became commonplace, banks were 
much less leveraged than what they are now (See e.g. Åhman, 1943 p. 70; Thies 
& Gerlowski, 1993; Saunders & Wilson, 1999.) High capitalisation ratios found 
in bank balance sheets from past decades probably give a reasonably accurate 
idea about the true leverage of banks in our grandparents’ time. Obviously 
early and mid 20th century banks did not consider equity highly expensive. 
There may be several explanations for this change in the way of thinking, and 
different explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
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Appendix 1 
Proof of Propositon 2
If the bank hoards enough currency to pay the dividend ηg in any state, E(ψ) 
is the multiple of the required amount of currency in the bad state (δD + ηgE + 
NλΩ), the opportunity cost of one unit of currency in the good state (α) and the 
probability of receiving the normal return (θ). Liquidation costs cannot mate-
rialise and the value of Z is irrelevant.
If the bank hoards enough currency to be able to pay dividends without 
liquidations in the good state only, the total cost is the sum of two components. 
•	 The	expected	value	of	the	opportunity	cost	of	holding	currency	is	αθ{δD + 
ηgE – αI + NλΩ}.
•	 In	the	bad	state	it	must	liquidate	assets	to	get	the	sum	Iα not received from 
investments. The expected value of the cost of asset liquidation, in case the 
dividend can be paid by liquidating, is (1 – θ)αI(1 – Z)/Z. If there are not 
sufficient assets to cover the payment needs, the cost is the maximal liqui-
dation loss I(1 – Z), which must be less.
In expected value terms the total cost of being prepared to pay dividends 
without liquidations only in the good state is lesser than the cost of having 
enough currency to make payments in any state at least if
θα(δD + ηgE – αI + NλΩ) + (1 – θ)αI(1 – Z)/Z < θ(δD + ηgE + NλΩ) α (1.1)
ó θ > (1 – Z) / [1 – Z + αZ] (1.2)
By assumption, this condition holds. There cannot be cases where the op-
timal value of L lies between δD + ηgE – αI + NλΩ and δD + ηgE + NλΩ. With 
such values of L the derivative of ψ with respect to L would be




The expression (1.2) is a sufficient but not a necessary condition because 
the bank may run out of assets, which limits the cost in the bad state, making 
hoarding of currency for the bad state less useful.
QED
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Appendix 2 
Proof of Proposition 3
Because E = N-D and I = N – L, the necessary amount of currency is
L = δD + ηg(N – D) – α (N – L) + NλΩ 
= > L = [ηgN + δD + NλΩ – Dηg – αN]/(1 – α)
(2.1)
The expected value of the cost of hoarding this amount of currency is the 
multiple of θ, α and expression (2.1).
The amount of investment revenue that does not materialise in the bad sta-
te is Iα. The cost of liquidating enough investments to get this missing sum is 
Iα(1 – Z)/Z, and the probability of this occurring is (1 – θ). Because I = N – L, 
and because L is determined by expression (2.1), the expected value of this cost 
component is 
Min[(1 – θ)α[(1 – Z)/Z][N – (ηgN + NλΩ + δD – Dηg – αN)/(1 – α)], 
(1 – Z)I]
(2.2)
The cost (1 – Z)I is incurred if the bank is unable to make all the payments 
even if it liquidates all the investments.
In the good state the cost consists of the opportunity cost of not making 
investments, which equals Lα. The probability of this occurring is θ. Because 
the amount of currency is determined by (2.1), the expected value of this cost is 
θα[ηgN + δD – Dηg – αN + NλΩ]/(1 – α) (2.3)
If the sum of (2.2) and (2.3) is differentiated with respect to D, one gets either
– θα(ηg – δ)/(1 – α) < 0 (2.4)
(if the bank is unable to pay the dividend in the bad state and nothing but the 
good state matters at the margin), or
(ηg – δ)(1 – θ – Z) α
(1 – α) Z
(2.5)
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The expression (2.5) is negative iff 1 – θ – Z < 0. The lowest value of θ in banks 
not able to make all payments without liquidations in the bad state is (1 – Z)/
(1 – Z + αZ). With this minimal value of θ
1 – θ – Z = 1 – Z – (1 – Z)/(1 – Z + αZ) < 0 ⇔ 1 – 1/[1 – Z(1 – α)] < 0 (2.6)
Because 0 < Z(1 – α) < 1, (2.6) holds with certainty. And because the deri-
vative of (2.5) with respect to θ is negative, (2.5) cannot become positive with 
higher values of θ. Therefore costs decrease when the deposit base expands at 
the cost of equity capital.
QED
Appendix 3. Proof of Proposition 4
Terminology and notation; Marginal benefit from dividends = the derivative of 
-(loss caused by the run) P
with respect to η, where P is the probability of the run.
ηa =dividend in the good state (investments yield α)
ηb = dividend in the bad state (no return on investments)
And * denotes optimal dividend.
Sub-proposition 1: Optimal ηa = [L + αI – Ωλ – δD]/E 
PROOF: Iff ηa < [L + αI – Ωλ – δD]/E, the good state marginal cost of paying 
more dividends is zero at stage three because there is no alternative use for ex-
cess currency. The marginal benefit is always positive. Therefore the optimal 
dividend in the good state satisfies a
*η  ≥ [L + αI – Ωλ – δD]/E
It is not possible to find cases where a
*η  is wholly or partly paid by liquida-
ting assets because it is never profitable to make investments that need to be 
liquidated anyway.
QED
Subproposition 2: If ηb = ηa = [(L + αI – ΩλN – δD)/E]–, the marginal cost of 
paying dividends in the bad state is E(1 – Z)/Z.2
2 Notation: X– = infinitesimally smaller than X
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PROOF: The sub-proposition 1 implies that this bad state dividend cannot be 
financed without liquidations. => The marginal cost of increasing the dividend 




*η  the marginal benefit of dividends in the good state < E(1 – Z)/Z.
PROOF: If the marginal benefit of the dividend in the good state were higher 
than E(1 – Z)/Z, it would be rational to increase the dividend even by liquidating 
because the benefit would exceed the cost.
The marginal cost of increasing the dividend ηa by hoarding more curren-
cy is αE in the good state. This is less than E(1 – Z)/Z because by assumption 
(1 – Z) > α and (1 – Z)/Z > (1 – Z). Therefore, whenever the marginal benefit 
exceeds E(1 – Z)/Z, it would have been optimal to hoard more currency.
The possibility of the bad state does not change the conclusion. Having more 
currency cannot increase the cost, and does not make currency hoarding less at-
tractive. Therefore a rational bank hoards currency until optimal a
*η  < E(1 – Z)/Z.
QED
Subproposition 4 The good state marginal benefit of increasing the dividend 
is higher or as high as in the bad state if ηb = ηa.
PROOF: In both cases the impact on the probability of the run is the same. 
In the bad state there are less assets because some of them have already been 
liquidated anyway in order to pay the dividend. Therefore there are less assets 
that might be lost in a run, decreasing the cost.
QED
Subpropositions 1 and 2 imply that the marginal cost of increasing ηb is 
E(1 – Z)/Z if ηb = a
*η –. Subpropositions 3 and 4 imply that when ηb = [(L + αI – 
ΩλN – δD)/E]–, the marginal benefit from increasing the dividend is less than 
E(1 – Z)/Z. Therefore the marginal cost is higher than the marginal benefit, and 
it is rational to reduce the dividend. Therefore a
*η  > a
*η .
QED.
b

